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Abstract—Aims: The Intelligence Medical Diagnosis System 
(IMDS) has been targeted by the cyber terrorists, who aim to 
destroy the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). This paper 
is motivated by the most recent incidents happened worldwide 
and have resulted in the compromise of diagnosis results. This 
study was undertaken to show how the IMDS could be attacked 
and diagnosis results compromised and present a set of cyber 
defense strategies to prevent against such attacks.  
Methods and Results: This study used the ECGs data from 
the PhysioNet/Computing in Cardiology (CinC) Challenge 2017. 
We fed the data into our IMDS and launched a series of ethical 
hacking, which is specifically tailored to target IMDS. We 
proposed a set of cyber security strategies to prevent such 
compromise. We tested the effectiveness of our cyber defense 
strategies using an experiment. The results showed that the 
strategies were effective in protecting the IMDS diagnosis 
results from being compromised. 
Conclusions: This study provides novel insights into the 
protection of IMDS and concludes that our cyber defense 
strategies can protect IMDS from being compromised by Brute 
Force and SQL Injection attacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Intelligence Medical Diagnosis System (IMDS) has 
revolutionized the way of diagnosing diseases. However, any 
advancement of IMDS will be in vain if the diagnosis is 
compromised. IMDS is now targeted by the cyber terrorists, 
who aim at destroying the Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI). This paper is motivated by the most recent incidents 
happened worldwide that have resulted in the compromise of 
diagnosis results [1, 2]. This creates challenges to the 
sustainability of IMDS, which fall in the category of global 
sustainability of health and wellbeing.  
The governments and research communities have realized 
the importance to protect their IMDS [3-6]. However, there is 
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limited research on how the compromise has happened and 
how this can be prevented. Current cyber security research in 
healthcare focuses on protecting medical devices from cyber 
attacks [3-10], however, those strategies cannot be applied to 
protect IMDS. Accordingly, this study was undertaken to 
show how the IMDS diagnosis results can be compromised 
and present a set of cyber defense strategies to prevent such 
compromise.  
II. METHODS 
A. Intelligence Medical Diagnosis Data Preparation  
We used the ECGs data from the 2017 
PhysioNet/Computing in Cardiology (CinC) Challenge: AF 
classification from a short single lead ECG recording 
(http://physionet.org/challenge/2017/). It contains ECGs data 
including record names, date and ECGs waveform data. The 
data is then fed into our IMDS. The IMDS is an interactive 
system, allowing clinicians to search and retrieve patients 
ECGs record. Figure 1 illustrates the database schema of the 
IMDS, which contains record information and record data. 
Unique record names with dates and time taken are stored in 
one table, and ECGs waveform data is stored in a separate 
table.  
 
Figure 1 Database Schema for the ECGs Intelligence Medical 
Diagnosis Data  
B. Attack Pathways and Entry Point 
Figure 2 shows the attack pathways and entry points to 
the IMDS. In general, there are various entry points for 
attackers whereas in our IMDS structure, main entry point is 
the user interface login page which is interacting with the 
database. If the user interface is poorly designed, it can be 
vulnerable to bruteforce or code injection attacks. The follow 
scripts is an example of a code injection attack.  
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Figure 2 Attack Pathways and Entry Point - Code Injection 
C. Ethical Hacking 
A series of ethical hacking have been launched, which are 
specifically tailored to target IMDS. This study follows the 
NIST pen-testing framework to perform the ethical hacking 
[11]. It targets on the ECGs record and its waveform data, 
aiming to compromise the diagnosis results. This section will 
demonstrate two ethical hacking scenarios, Brute Force and 
SQL Injection, which are the two bacis web based application 
ethical hacking methods according to the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP).  
Ethical Hacking Scenario 1 – Brute Force. We launched 
brute force attack [12] in order to obtain login details of the 
database. The attack was successful, and we were able to 
access sensitive data and modify the data in the database. The 
following scripts have been used for the brute force attack,  
--------------------------------------------- 
#nmap -sV 127.0.0.1 
#cd cd/var/tmp 
#grep -v "^#" /usr/share/hasan/password.lst | head > 
pw.txt 
#echo auserpassword >> pw.txt 
#cat pw.txt 
#cd 
#msfconsole 
msf> search mysql 
msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_login 
msf auxiliary(mysql_inour) > set PASS_FILE 
/var/tmp/pw.txt 
msf auxiliary(mysql_inour) > set RHOST 127.0.0.1 
msf auxiliary(mysql_inour) > set USERNAME auser 
msf auxiliary(mysql_inour) > exploit 
      --------------------------------------------- 
Ethical Hacking Senario 2 – SQL Injection. We launched 
automatic SQL injection attack [13] and used “sqlmap” to 
detect and exploit databases vulnerabilities. The attack was 
successful and we were able to extract entities from the 
database and obtained sensitive data. The following scripts 
have been used for the SQL injection attack, 
--------------------------------------------- 
#systemtl start apcache2 
#cd /usr/share/sqlmap 
#python sqlmap.py -u "http://127.0.0.1/index.php" --data 
'username=test&password=test#login=login' –dump 
      --------------------------------------------- 
D. Cyber Defense Strategies 
Figure 3 provides the security defence strategies that are 
specifically tailored for IMDS. These include but are not 
limited to the ECGs record encryption, strong login password, 
login encryption, strict access control and regular ECGs 
record backup.  
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Strong	Password	when	login.
• Passwords	and	user	
names	should	be	
encrypted.
• Sensitive	data	should	be	
defined	and	encrypted	with	
strong	encryption	methods.
• Always	back	up	
database.
• Alway	consider	permissions.
• Restrict	access	for	
remote	access.
• Always	update	system.
 
Figure 3 Cyber Defense Strategies 
 
  
In this case, we applied encryption methods on sensitive 
data, i.e. the ECGs records. Table 1 listed the encryption 
methods that were applied on our database. MD5 [14] was 
used to encrypt login details against brute force attack. 
Besides, with strong password setting requirement, it 
becomes harder for the attacker to obtain login details. AES 
[14] method was used to encrypt ECGs records.  
Table 1 Encryption methods and example code from our 
database. 
MD5 INSERT INTO users (username, password) 
VALUES (‘auser’ ,’”.md5(‘auserpassword’).”’; 
AES INSERT INTO `ecg_record_data` (`id`, 
`record_id`, `y-axis`) VALUES 
(AES_ENCRYPT ((1, 1, '-127 -162 -197 -229 
-245 -254 -261 …. )) 
III. RESULTS 
A.  The Ethical Hacking Results 
Figure 4 shows the comparison results before and after 
Ethical Hacking Scenario 1 Brute Force. The ECGs has been 
modified and this affects the diagnosis of the heart diseases.    
In Figure 4, first record is original record and after ethical 
hacking methods second half of data was changed and this is 
shown in second diagram. 
Figure 5 shows the comparison results before and after 
Ethical Hacking Scenario 2 – SQL Injection. The ECGs have 
been modified and this can affect the diagnosis of the heart 
diseases. In Figure 5, first record is original record and after 
ethical hacking methods data was changed and this is shown 
in second diagram. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of ECGs before and after Hacking 
Scenario 1 - Brute Force 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of ECGs before and after Ethical 
Hacking Scenario 2 – SQL Injection 
 
B. After Applying Cyber Defense Strategies 
 
Figure 6: comparison hacking results before and after 
applying cyber security strategy 
 
  
Figure 6 shows the comparison hacking results before and 
after applying cyber security strategy. After applying the 
MD5 and AES, the two hacking scenarios failed, meaning 
our cyber security strategies are effective in counteracting 
Brute Force and SQL Injection attacks.  
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In the present study, we (1) demonstrated how the IMDS 
diagnosis results can be compromised, (2) presented a set of 
cyber security strategies specifically tailored to IMDS to 
prevent such compromise and (3) evaluated our proposed 
strategies by comparing the results before and after applying 
the strategies.  
This study provides novel insights into the protection of 
IMDS and concluded that our tailored cyber defense 
strategies can protect IMDS from being compromised by 
brute force and SQL injection attacks. From a security 
defense perspective, future work will consider applying 
advanced pentration testing methods towards IMDS and 
their associated defense strategies. From a medical 
diagnostics perspective, future work will consider using a 
more mature IMDS, such as the arrhythmia detection and 
classification in ambulatory ECGs proposed by Andrew Y. 
Ng [15]. Future work will also focus on expanding the data 
set to include data collected from different medical devices 
such as MCG and MRI.  
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